



Linphone Instant Messaging Encryption

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Agenda

- Security requirements
- Protocol overview
- Integration in Linphone group chat with multidevices environment
- Man in the middle attack detection

Linphone

- Is around since 2001
- Is available on android, iOS, Windows, Mac, Linux
- Uses SIP standards for audio, video and instant messaging
- Support group messaging, multiple devices per account

Linphone's team also provides

- Flexisip, an open source SIP Proxy
- A free SIP service sip.linphone.org

Major security requirements for a secure IM :

- Protect content: end-to-end encryption
- Confirm sender and recipient identity: authentication
- Past conversation safe in case of key compromised: forward secrecy
- Recover from compromised key: future secrecy
- Minimal effort from users

First implementation in 2014, based on SCIMP:

- End-to-end encryption and authentication
- Symmetric ratchet provides forward secrecy
- **Limited future secrecy**
- **Users must perform an audio call before exchanging any encrypted message**
- **Not adapted to group chat (not available in Linphone back in 2014)**


Based on the Signal protocol

- End-to-end encryption
- Forward and future secrecy
- Asynchronous
- Large deployments
- Open source implementation, well documented: <https://signal.org/docs/>

Extended to support

- Multiple device per account
- Group chat with future secrecy
- Practical mutual authentication method

7 – Create Lime session,
decrypt message from Bob



Keys set: Asynchronous key agreement protocol: X3DH

- Public key published on the key server, private key on device only
 - Identity Key (*Ik*): long-term life span, used for both signature(**Sig**) and key exchange (**DH**).
 - Signed PreKey (*SPk*): medium-term life span(weeks), key exchange only.
 - One Time PreKey (*OPk*): discarded after one use in a key exchange.
- On device only, public key in message header
 - Ephemeral Key (*Ek*): used once, private key is discarded immediately.

Bob initiates an exchange: compute a shared Secret *Sk*

- Fetch *IkA*, *SPkA*, **Sig**(*IkA*, *SPkA*) and *OPkA* generated by Alice
- Verify **Sig**(*IkA*, *SpkA*)
- Generate *EkB*
- Compute :
 - $DH1 = \mathbf{DH}(IkB, SpkA)$, $DH2 = \mathbf{DH}(EkB, IkA)$
 - $DH3 = \mathbf{DH}(EkB, SpkA)$, $DH4 = \mathbf{DH}(EkB, OpkA)$
 - $Sk = \mathbf{KFD}(DH1, DH2, DH3, DH4)$
- Delete *EkB* private key
- Generate $AD = IkB, IkA, Bob\ Id, Alice\ Id$
- Feed encryption protocol with *Sk* and *AD*
- Send *IkB* and *EkB* with the first message to Alice

Alice receives Bob's message and keys

- Compute :
 - $DH1 = \mathbf{DH}(SpkA, IkB)$, $DH2 = \mathbf{DH}(IkA, EkB)$
 - $DH3 = \mathbf{DH}(SpkA, EkB)$, $DH4 = \mathbf{DH}(OpkA, EkB)$
 - $Sk = \mathbf{KFD}(DH1, DH2, DH3, DH4)$
- Generate $AD = IkB, IkA, Bob\ Id, Alice\ Id$
- Feed decryption protocol with *Sk* and *AD*


Exchange encrypted messages using the Double Ratchet protocol

Diffie-Hellman ratchet

Symmetric key ratchet

Receiving Chain

Sending Chain



Lib lime: <https://gitlab.linphone.org/BC/public/lime>

- Written in C++11
- Flexible use core cryptographic functions
 - support curve-25519 and curve-448 ECDH and Signature
- Signalisation and transport agnostic: can be used with any protocol providing a unique device Id and a connexion to a key server
- Langage bindings to C, java, python

Device identification:


- User identified by a SIP URI: *sip:<username>@<domain>*
- Device identified by a GRUU (RFC5627): *<sip:uri>;gr=urn:uuid:<unique id>*

Flexisip SIP proxy, conference server:


- Manage user devices
- Manage group members
- Route encrypted messages

Secure device/server connection:


- TLS
- Digest authentication



Linphone Instant Messaging Encryption: multiple devices data flow



Linphone Instant Messaging Encryption: Encrypted Message Structure




Pros:

- Group management completely transparent for encryption layer
- Future secrecy maintained
- Group membership fully under device control

Cons:

- Cannot handle massive groups (a few hundred devices is still fine)
- Participant overhead around 100 bytes

8 – Create Lime session
decrypt message from Eve/Bob





Associate Identity Key (*Ik*) with device Id (GRUU):

- Signal protocol documentation: *“If authentication is not performed, the parties receive no cryptographic guarantee as to whom they are communicating with.”*
- Implemented solutions:
 - Key fingerprint manual comparison
 - QR code scan on peer device

Leverage ZRTP (RFC6189) MitM protection to authenticate peer's *Ik*:

- ZRTP SAS comparison during audio call detects MitM
- Uses auxiliary secret ZRTP feature
- Is automatic and transparent for users
- Is performed on every call, even before exchanging messages
- ZRTP implementation extends RFC to use ECDH on curves 25519 and 448





Peer Status :



- Untrusted: identity never confirmed




- Trusted: identity confirmed through ZTRP SAS validation



- Unsafe: Man-in-the-Middle attack detected

Conversation Status :

- Lowest status of all devices involved
- Easy access to all devices included in the conversation and their status



- Linphone website: <https://www.linphone.org>
- Lime corner: <https://www.linphone.org/technical-corner/lime>
- Lime implementation document:
<https://gitlab.linphone.org/BC/public/lime/blob/master/lime.pdf>
- Signal protocol: <https://signal.org/docs/>

Thank you